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Introduction
• Using a power transition perspective, this
paper analyzes the regional and global
implications of different enlargement
formulation of the European Union (EU)
during the first half of the 21st century.

– First, it assesses the consequences of
expanded EU membership with varying
enlargement scenarios on global power
distributions and considers the EU’s position in
the new world order.
– Next, the paper examines EU’s external
economic and security relations and considers
how they might be affected by future
enlargement of the Union.

Theory and the Analytic
Model
• The model we utilize in this study is based on
research that started with A.F.K. Organski’s (1958)
seminal work in world politics and later developed by
Kugler and Organski (1980) and Tammen et al (2000).
• The most basic proposition is that war is most likely
to occur when the relative power of two competing
nations approaches parity.
• A second fundamental proposition is that nations do
not interact in anarchy.

– The dominant nation establishes the status quo and
persuades some to join and be satisfied with the existing
order.
– When parity approaches, a dissatisfied challenger is likely to
challenge and may wage war against the dominant nation.
– Under similar conditions, a satisfied challenger may seek
integration.

Theory and model
• In addition to power and status quo dynamics,
power transition theory includes the concept
of hierarchal relationships among global
powers.
• We focus on ordering within hierarchies to
determine the role of hierarchies in
cooperation and conflict.
– An unordered hierarchy emerges when most
nations hold roughly equal shares of power.
– Ordered hierarchies are characterized by power
concentrated in the hands of a dominant global or
regional power who establishes and supports the
status quo.

The model
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CI = Conflict - Integration
RP = Relative Power
S = Status Quo
Hc = Hierarchy of Challenger
Hd = Hierarchy of Defender

c
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The model
• The dependent variable is a measure
of the deepening of integration at
the one end of the spectrum and
worsening conflict at the other end:

High
Severity of Conflict

neutral

High
Level of Integration

Integration Achievement Score
(IAS)
•

•

First developed by Hufbauer
and Schott (1994) and
further advanced by Efird
and Genna (2002)
six categories that measure
the level of regional
integration.

– Free movement of goods and
services
– Free movement of capital
– Free movement of labor
– Supranational institutions
– Monetary coordination
– Fiscal coordination

•

Each category has a value of 0
(low) through 5 (high) along a
Guttman scale:

Measure of conflict
•
•

The second part of this scale
measures the level of conflict
among nations.
Estimates are taken from the
Hostility Level data developed by
the COW project. These data are
transformed to reflect intensity
following Goldstein (1992) who
surveyed a panel of foreign policy
experts—averaging their weighting
of events—so that WEIS events
ranging from conflict to extreme
conflict can be classified. Efird
(2000) reports the resulting
conversion of COW Hostility
Scores to Goldstein-WEIS scaling
scores are as follows:

Hostility
Level
Coding

Description of
Coding

GoldsteinWEIS
Interval

Adjusted
ConflictIntegration
Interval

0

No event

0

4.00

1

No militarized action

-2.4

4.96

2

Threat to use force

-5.8

6.32

3

Display of force

-7.6

7.04

4

Use of Force

-8.3

7.32

5

War

-10.0

8.00

Independent Variables
• Relative Power

– Measure of relative power is GDP that includes the number of
people who can work and fight, their economic productivity.
– Population is a solid base but alone does not translate into power.
This is apparent in the relative weakness of India, Indonesia, or
Brazil - the population also must be productive for a country to be
powerful.
– For this reason developed countries have far more influence in
international relations than their developing counterparts.

• Satisfaction

– Status quo represented as S, is the joint satisfaction of the
challenger and defender with their dyadic relationship. It reflects
the set of similar policies and preferences for each dyad. We rely
on Tucker’s (1999) computations of the S-statistic for all alliances
since 1816, and EUGene is used to aggregate the data into dyadic
format (Bennett and Stam 2000a).

• Hierarchy

Measuring Hierarchies
Dominated Hierarchy
1.2

1.0

Relative Power

• The view of hierarchies
utilized here rests on Efird
(2000) and Efird et al (2004)
Each region is dominated by
varying degrees, by a
regionally-powerful country. In
turn, all nations then compete
at the global level. In this
formulation, even the great
powers are constrained by
their particular regional
concerns. If their
“neighborhood” is not in order
or consistent with their
preferences, then they are
unlikely to look further abroad
for a conflict.
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ANALYSIS
•
•
•
•
•

Global power transition,
EU as a global actor,
Current enlargement of the EU,
Future enlargement of the EU,
Expected and unexpected
consequences of future EU
enlargement(s)!

Future European Union
• EU25
• EU29
– Add Bulgaria and Romania (2007)
– Add Croatia (2008-2010)
– Add Turkey (2014-2020)

Forecasting GDP Shares and GDP Per Capita
for EU25, EU29 and Global Competitors:
2000-2050 (size of the bubble represents per capita
productivity measured in PPP)

Power Transition 2000-2050
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Forecasting Conflict-Cooperation:
EU25-Turkey, 2000-2050

Increasing
Severity of Conflict

War

Increasing
Intensity of
Cooperation

Neutrality

Integration

EU Enlargement & Turkey
• The simulation results indicate no conflict is likely to occur
between Turkey and the current EU25, rather the
possibility of further integration extends for the near
future. This is consistent with reality.
• Turkey and the EU already have a customs union agreement
with increasing bilateral trade and investment between
their economies. Therefore, it is highly probably that
integration will continue to deepen.
• Turkey’s also substantiates the expected positive
contribution to EU’s future growth within the global
hierarchy.
• That result substantiates the Commission’s findings on this
subject in 2004.
• Our analysis thus suggests a likely accession of Turkey into
the EU despite current rumblings among some member
states’ reservations about Turkey’s place in the Union.

Implications of EU29 for
the Middle East
GDP Share and Per Capita GDP Between Iran, Israel, Russia, and Turkey: 2000-2050
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Figure 7. Forecasting Conflict-Cooperation: Iran-Turkey, 2000-2050
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Figure 9: Forecasting Conflict-Cooperation: Russia-Turkey, 2000-2050

Figure 8: Forecasting Conflict-Cooperation: Iran-Russia, 2000-2050
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Figure 10: GDP Shares and GDP Per Capita Between EU29 and Iran: 2000 - 2050
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Figure 11: Forecasting Conflict-Cooperation: EU29-Iran, 2000-2050
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Conclusions
• Findings in this paper reaffirm the earlier global results that
China is expected to reach parity with the US in 2025-2030 and
move ahead to be the largest economy in the world.
• The US, will continue to have largest per capita productivity
among the three giants and will retain its second rank status way
into this century.
• The economic future of the EU, is not quite as promising.
– Regardless of its enlargement plans, the EU will fall behind the
others giants becoming the third largest economy.
– Part of the expected decline in its GDP share could be offset by
adding Turkey.
– Contrary to current public opinion in the EU, it is only after
Turkey’s accession that EU’s economic decline levels off and starts
to increase in its projected per capita productivity.

Conclusions cont.
•
•
•
•

•
•

Turkey’s EU membership will have important implication for regional
stability in the Middle East.
Russia’s dominance in northern Middle East is in decline while Iran and
Turkey appear to be the regional challengers.
There exists parity between Iran and Turkey with the former slightly
moving ahead in the next 40 years.
We also observe that dyatic relationship between Iran and Turkey is
one of high probability of conflict that intensify very quickly with time.
– competition for influence in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Iraq.
– they represent two polar opposite political systems of the region – Iran is a
Shi’a theocracy while Turkey is a Western style secular ( laicist) democracy.
– Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.
– Future of Iraq.

Turkey’s membership in the EU would stabilize the volatile Middle East
by removing Iran’s growing challenge in the region.
Turkey’s membership in the EU should be encouraged by leaders of the
Transatlantic Alliance to stabilize this volatile region.

